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Evans: Evans: Split-Recovery Survives:

"Split-Recovery" Survives:
The Missouri Supreme Court Upholds
the State's Power to Collect One-Half

of Punitive Damage Awards
Fust v. Attorney Generalof Missouri1
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapidly increasing rates of tort litigation across the United States recently
have been paralleled by astronomical increases in punitive damages awards.23
These increases have led many commentators to call for tort reform generally,
and for reform in the area of punitive damages specifically.4 Proposed solutions
have ranged from absolute bans on punitive damage awards to punitive damage
"caps" which are proportional to compensatory damage awards.' "Splitrecovery ' '6 statutes represent an increasingly popular method of mitigating the

1. 947 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1997).
2. "Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade ago, the
largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability
case was $250,000. Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have been sustained
on appeal." Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); but see Theodore
Eisenberg, et. al., The PredictabilityofPunitiveDamages,26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997)
(an empirical study contending that punitive damages are substantially proportional to
compensatory damage awards); Steven L. Hobson, Recent Developments Affecting
Punitive Damages, 50 J. Mo. B. 225, 229 (1994) ("[T]here is no empirical data
demonstrating [an increase in frequency or size of punitive damage awards] to be a
problem in Missouri."); Justice Janie L. Shores, A Suggestionfor Limited Tort Reform:
Allocation ofPunitiveDamage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61, 74
(1992) (asserting that there is little empirical evidence for the proposition that punitive
damage awards have increased greatly in size and frequency in recent years).
3. See, e.g., Matthew J. Klaben, Split-Recovery Statutes: The Interplay of the
Takings and Excessive Fines Clauses, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 104, 105 (1994) (citing
David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice ProposalsIrks Bar Association, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al (reporting on Quayle's proposals for reforming the civil
litigation system)).
4. See Klaben, supra note 3, at 105, for "[t]wo fundamental problems [which]
caused reformers to focus their efforts on punitive damages.' For a different perspective,
see Hobson, supra note 2, at 228 ("[S]ome commentators have suggested that opponents
of exemplary damages have politicized the debate over punitive damages as part of an
intense, well-organized, and well-financed political campaign by interest groups seeking
fundamental reforms in the civil justice system benefitting themselves.").
5. Klaben, supranote 3, at 108.
6. See Recent Case,Eight Amendment PunitiveDamages-FloridaSupreme Court
Upholds "Split-Recovery" Statute-Gordonv. State, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1691 (1993)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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problem These statutes allow a state to collect a portion of an award of
punitive damages, typically for deposit into the state's general revenue or into
a fund specified by, and often created by, the statute.8
To date, eleven states, including Missouri, have enacted split-recovery
statutes,9 which have been hailed as an effective way to deal with many of the
problems presented by punitive damage awards.'" However, much litigation has
arisen regarding the constitutionality of split-recovery statutes. These challenges
have been initiated both by plaintiffs, who lose part of their punitive damages
awards to the state," and defendants, who must pay a portion of the damages
assessed against them to the state. 2 Although most split-recovery statutes have
survived such constitutional attacks, 3 the statutes still are heavily debated among
legal commentators and scholars.
In Fust v. Attorney Generalof Missouri,the Supreme Court of Missouri

upheld the validity of Missouri's split-recovery statute. Missouri's statute deems
fifty percent of any punitive damage award to be rendered in favor of the State
of Missouri to be deposited into the 'Tort Victims' Compensation Fund" created

(using the label "split recovery" to describe these statutes); Clay R. Stevens, SplitRecovery: A ConstitutionalAnswerto the PunitiveDamagesDilemma, 21 PEPP. L. REV.

857 (1994) (same); Klaben, supranote 3 (same). These statutes are also labeled "stateallocation" statutes. See Paul F. Kirgis, The Constitutionalityof State Allocation of
PunitiveDamage Awards, 50 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 843 (1993).

7. For a comprehensive overview of the validity, construction, and application of
split-recovery statutes, see Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of StatutesRequiringthat Percentageof PunitiveDamageAwards be Paid
Directly to State or CourtAdministered Funds, 16 A.L.R. 5th. 129 (1994).

8. E.g., Missouri's split-recovery statute provides for collected monies to be
deposited in the "TortVictims' Compensation Fund," which was created by the statute.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(1) (1988).
9. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (West 1997) (repealed); FLA. STAT.

ANN. §768.73 (West 1997) (repealed); GA.CODE ANN. §51-12-5.1(e) (Supp. 1994); 735
ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-6 (West
1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (1996);

Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (1994); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 8701 (McKinney Supp.
1994) (statute expired by virtue of its sunset clause); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1) (1991
& Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992).

10. See, e.g., Klaben, supra note 3, at 157; Stevens, supranote 6, at 908; Kirgis,
supra note 6, at 873.
11. See, e.g., McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga.
1990); Kirk v. Denver Pub'g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991); Shepherd Components,
Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue &Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
12. See, e.g., Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa
1994); Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
13. Only two courts have found a state's split-recovery statute to be
unconstitutional. See McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1579; Kirk, 818 P.2d at 264.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/11
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by the statute. 4 In rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that the statute was
unconstitutional, the court reached the same result as a majority of other
jurisdictions presented with the same issue." In doing so, the court has upheld
the validity of a statute that ostensibly ameliorates some of the problems
associated with punitive damage awards. Two questions, however, remain at
issue. The first is whether the Missouri government will begin enforcing the
statute and promulgate rules providing for disbursement from the Tort Victims'
Compensation Fund, thereby benefitting the class of persons to be served by the
split-recovery statute. The second is whether Missouri's split-recovery statute
can survive future constitutional attacks, based upon grounds other than those
raised in Fust.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In April 1994, ajury returned a verdict in favor of Carl and Rita Fust at the
conclusion of their malicious prosecution action against David Francois and
Butler Hill Investment, Inc. 6 After a bifurcated punitive damages phase of the
trial, Carl Fust was awarded $375,000 in punitive damages against each
defendant, and Rita Fust was awarded $450,000 in punitive damages against
each defendant. 7 This award, as well as the award of compensatory damages,
subsequently was reduced at a post-trial remittitur.'8 Defendant Francois

14. Section 537.675 of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides, in full:
1. There is created the "Tort Victims' Compensation Fund." Unexpended
moneys in the fund shall not lapse at the end of the biennium as provided in
Section 33.080 of Missouri's Revised Statutes.
2. Fifty percent of any final judgment awarding punitive damages after the
deduction of attorneys' fees and expenses shall be deemed rendered in favor
of the state of Missouri. The circuit clerks shall notify the attorney general of
any final judgment awarding punitive damages rendered in their circuits.
With respect to such fifty percent, the attorney general shall collect upon such
judgment, and may execute or make settlements with respect thereto as he
deems appropriate for deposit into the fund.
3. The state of Missouri shall have no interest in or right to intervene at any
stage of any judicial proceeding under this section.
4. No disbursement shall be made from the tort victims' compensation fund
until procedures for disbursement are established by further action of the
general assembly.
15. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
16. Fust v. Francois, 913 S.W.2d 38, 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
17. Id.
18. Id. Although the opinion in Fust v. Attorney General states that the Fusts'
final, combined punitive damages award totaled $330,000, the actual post-remittitur
award entitled Carl Fust to collect $150,000 from each defendant, and entitled Rita Fust
to collect $180,000 from each defendant, for a combined punitive damages award of
$660,000. Francois, 913 S.W.2d at 43-44. As for post-remittitur compensatory
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri, which
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.' 9
The Fusts then initiated the present action in the Circuit Court of Cole
County, Missouri. 20 The Fusts sought a declaratory judgment that Section
573.675 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri was unconstitutional. 21 That statute
provides, in part, that "[flifty percent of any final judgment awarding punitive
damages ... shall be deemed rendered in favor of the state of Missouri, ' to be
deposited in the "Tort Victims' Compensation Fund" created by the statute.'
After both parties moved for summary judgment, the circuit court denied the
Fusts' motion and granted the defendants' motion.24
Appealing to the Supreme Court of Missouri z5 the Fusts made a multipronged attack as to the constitutionality of Section 537.675. First, they argued
that House Bill 700, which was the basis for Section 537.675, contained more
than one subject,2 6 and that the subject matter of the statute was not contained in
the title of the bill,27 in contravention of article III, section 2328 of the
Constitution of the State of Missouri. Second, they contended that the statute
attempts to grant public monies to private persons,29 in violation of article III,
Section 38(a) 30 of the Missouri Constitution. Third, the Fusts asserted that the
statute directs that monies received by Missouri go into a fund other than the
state treasury, and authorizes disbursement without appropriation,3' thus
violating article III, section 3632 of the Missouri Constitution. Fourth, they
damages, Carl Fust was awarded $200,000 jointly and severally, and Rita Fust was
awarded $240,000 jointly and severally. Id. at 43.
19. Francois,913 S.W.2d at 42.
20. Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424,427 (Mo. 1997).
21. Id.
22. Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.675(2) (Supp. 1997).
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(1) (Supp. 1997).
24. Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 1,Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947
S.W.2d 424,424 (Mo. 1997) (79416).
25. "The Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases
involving the validity... of a statute ... of this state .... " MO. CONST. art.V, § 3.
26. Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 12-3 1, Fust v. Attorney Gen.,
947 S.W.2d 424,427 (Mo. 1997) (79416).
27. Id.
28. "No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed
in its title .... " Mo. CONST. art. III, § 23.
29. Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 43-44, Fust v. Attorney Gen.,
947 S.W.2d 424,429 (Mo. 1997) (79416).
30. "The general assembly shall have no power to grant public money or property
... to any private person.. . ." MO. CONST. art. IH, § 38(a).
31. Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 44-47, Fust v. Attorney Gen.,
947 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Mo. 1997) (79416).

32. "All revenue collected and money received by the state shall go into the
treasury and the general assembly shall have no power to divert the same or to permit the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/11
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argued that the statute violates the separation of powers33 prescribed by article
34
II, section 1,
and article V, section 1,35 of the Missouri Constitution. Fifth, the
Fusts claimed that the statute violates the "certain remedy"36 provision of article
I, section 143' of the Missouri Constitution. Sixth, they argued that the statute
denied them the natural right to the enjoyment of the gains of their own
industry,38 in contravention of article I, section 239 of the Missouri Constitution.
Seventh, the Fusts contended that the statute deprived them of their property
without due process of law,' in violation of article I, section 1041 of the Missouri
Constitution. Finally, the Fusts asserted that the statute violates the Equal
Protection Clause42 of the Constitution of the United States,43 and, similarly, is

withdrawal of money from the treasury, except in pursuance of appropriations made by
law." Mo. CoNsT. art. Il, § 36.
33. Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 47-51, Fust v. Attorney Gen.,
947 S.W.2d 424,430 (Mo. 1997) (79416).
34. "The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments-the legislature, executive and judicial-each of which shall be confided
to a separate magistracy, and no person ... shall exercise any power properly belonging
to either of the others ....
" MO. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
35. "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, a court of
appeals consisting of districts as prescribed by law, and circuit courts." Mo. CONST. art.
V,§ 1.
36. Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 55-56, Fust v. Attorney Gen.,
947 S.W.2d 424,431 (Mo. 1997) (79416).
37. "That the courts ofjustice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy
afforded for every injury to person, property, or character... ." Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14.
38. Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 56-57, Fust v. Attorney Gen.,
947 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Mo. 1997) (79416).
39. "[T]hat all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness
and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry ....
." Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2.
40. Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 51-54, Fust v. Attorney Gen.,
947 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Mo. 1997) (79416).
41. "That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." Mo. CONST. art. I, § 10.

42. Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 54-55, Fust v. Attorney Gen.,
947 S.W.2d 424,431 (Mo. 1997) (79416).
43. "No State shall ...

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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a "special law"' prohibited by article III, section 4041 of the Missouri
Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief
Justice Holstein, rejected each of the Fusts' arguments, holding that Section
537.675 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri is constitutional, thereby upholding
the power of the State of Missouri to collect one-half of punitive damage
awards.'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Policy Considerationsof PunitiveDamage Awards
As the rate of tort litigation increased in the United States over the last few
decades, cries for tort reform resounded across the nation.47 Those advocating
such reform often seized upon the issue of punitive damages, citing the
exponential growth, in both frequency and individual size, of such awards.4"
Many of the arguments advanced and solutions proposed by scholars and
commentators have merit. However, the concept of punitive damage awards
appears to be far from altogether abandoned, and most scholars concede that
such awards serve desirable ends. 49
The existence of punitive damages may be traced through history for
thousands of years."0 The concept of allowing a plaintiff to recover beyond
damages actually sustained was certainly alive and well at English common
law,5' and survives today in almost every American state.52 Although there is

44. Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 54-55, Fust v. Attorney Gen.,
947 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Mo. 1997) (79416).
45. "The general assembly shall not pass any local or special law: ...(4) ...
providing or changing methods for the ...enforcing ofjudgments .... ." MO. CONST.
art. III, § 40. A special law "includes less than all who are similarly situated.., but a
law is not special if it applies to all of a given class alike and the classification is made
on a reasonable basis." Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 432 (citing Batek v. Curators of the Univ.
of Mo., 920 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. 1996) (omission in original)).
46. Fust,947 S.W.2d at 433.
47. See, e.g., Margolick, supra note 3.
48. See supranote 2; Malcolm E.Wheeler, The ConstitutionalCasefor Reforming
PunitiveDamages Procedures,69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983).
49. One author has even suggested that "without punitive damages, the people of
America could find themselves driving repainted, exploding Ford Pintos while washing
down unsafe drugs with scalding coffee." Richard W. Murphy, Superbifurcation:
Making Room for State Prosecutionin the PunitiveDamages Process,76 N.C. L. REV.
463, 468 (1998).
50. Shores, supra note 2, at 62-63 (tracing punitive damages back to the Covenant
Code, or Law of Moses, and the Code of Hammurabi of ancient Babylon).
51. JAMEs D. GHIRARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PuNiTIV DAMAGEs LAW & PRAC.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/11
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some disagreement, most commentators concur on the basic principles and goals
justifying such non-compensatory awards. Of these rationales, the most often
cited are: 1) punishment and deterrence of defendants and others prone to engage
in the tortious conduct;"3 2) providing plaintiffs with incentive to bring suit in
cases which would otherwise be too costly or which hold little potential
recovery;' 3) compensating plaintiffs for their non-pecuniary losses, which are
often difficult to determine and quantify;" s and 4) compensating plaintiffs for
litigation expenses, particularly attorney's fees."6
The most common argument for punitive damages is that they serve to
punish the defendant for his conduct, and deter him and others from engaging in
the undesirable conduct in the future.57 Compensatory awards are viewed by
some as insufficient to achieve these goals; punitive damages are required so as
to greater "hurt" the defendant.5 8 Punishment, in turn, is viewed as desirable, as
the effects include giving the plaintiff the satisfaction of seeing the defendant
suffer the punishment,benefitting the public at large, rewarding law-abiders by
reinforcing their confidence in the legal system, and re-educating the wrongdoer
and allowing her to atone for her wrongs.5 9 Deterrence of future wrongdoings,
both by the original tortfeasor and others, is similarly desirable, and is promoted
by punitive damages and the consequential negative publicity.6"
The potential for an award of punitive damages also may give some
plaintiffs, whose costs would otherwise be too great or potential recovery too

§ 1.01 (1997). (comprehensive survey of punitive damage awards, including the
historical perspective, rationale, and constitutionality of such awards).
52. However, some states do not allow punitive damages to be assessed against
certain defendants, or in certain situations. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-26 (1997)
(prohibiting punitive damages against any state agency); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102
(1997) (prohibiting punitive damages in administrative proceedings or arbitration). Other
states do not allow punitive damage awards at all, or only when punitives are specifically
authorized by statute. See, e.g., Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960) ("It
has been a fundamental rule of law in this state [Nebraska] that punitive, vindictive, or
exemplary damages will not be allowed .... "); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1986)
(prohibiting punitive damage awards unless authorized by statute).
53. See GHIARDI, supranote 51, at §§ 2.01-2.09; Stevens, supra note 6, at 861-62.
54. Stevens, supranote 6, at 862-64.
55. Id. at 864-86.
56. Id. at 866-67.
57. But see LINDA L. SCHLUETTER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PuNrrIvE DAMAGES,
§ 2.2(A)(2) (3d. ed. 1995) (asserting that the purpose of civil law is compensation, not
punishment); GHIARDI, supra note 51, § 2.09 (stating that it is "highly unlikely" that
punitive damages have a general deterrent effect except as to those with legal
knowledge).
58. Stevens, supra note 6, at 861.
59. Hobson, supra note 2, at 225-26.
60. Stevens, supra note 6, at 861-62.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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small, an incentive to bring suit against those who have wronged them. 61 As a
corollary, punitive damages are seen as a "reward" for plaintiffs who have
expended time and money in the litigation process. 62 However, although society
certainly has an interest in "preventing those who recklessly injure others or who
commit socially unacceptable acts from escaping punishment,"63 a major
criticism of punitive damages is that the incentive to litigate is so great that
undesirable levels of litigation result.64
Beyond these "universally recognized 65 policy considerations, some
commentators suggest that punitive damages serve to compensate plaintiffs for
non-pecuniary injuries that are often difficult to determine and that remain
unaccounted for in an award of compensatory damages." Likewise, punitive
damages may be viewed as a way to compensate plaintiffs for litigation
expenses, particularly attorneys' fees.' Because these expenses usually are quite
substantial, a plaintiff who is "made whole" by an award of compensatory
damages is still likely to sustain a pecuniary loss. 68 Nonetheless, most legal
scholars have disavowed these as legitimate purposes of punitive damage
awards,69 and the United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected the
former.7"
The Supreme Court of Missouri recently reiterated the purpose of punitive
damages in Missouri, which is "to inflict punishment and to serve as an example
and a deterrent to similar conduct." 7' An award of punitive damages in Missouri
is appropriate if a defendant "showed complete indifference to or a conscious
disregard for the safety of others; '72 such conduct must be proven by "clear and
convincing" evidence. 73 As the purpose of punitive damages in Missouri is not
to compensate the plaintiff, no particular relationship between the amount of
compensatory damages and the amount of punitive damages is required,
although the relationship must, at minimum, be "reasonable."74 A jury in
Missouri therefore has great discretion in awarding punitive damages, and may
consider such factors as: the degree of the defendant's malice; the age, sex,
health, character, and financial worth of the plaintiff; the injury the plaintiff has

61.
62.
63.
64.

Stevens, supranote 6, at 862.
Stevens, supranote 6, at 863.
Stevens, supranote 6, at 862.
Stevens, supranote 6, at 864.
65. Stevens, supra note 6, at 861.
66. Stevens, supranote 6, at 864-66.
67. Stevens, supranote 6, at 866-67; but see GHIARDI, supranote 51, § 2.11.
68. Stevens, supranote 6, at 866.
69. Stevens, supranote 6, at 865.
70. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
71. Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 849 (Mo. 1996).
72. Id.; MAI 10.02 [1996 Revision].
73. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 111 (Mo. 1997).
74. Carpenter v. Chrysler Corp., 853 S.W.2d 346, 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/11
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suffered; the intelligence, affluence, financial worth, and character of the
defendant; and any other circumstances surrounding the defendant's act,
including mitigating and aggravating circumstances.75

B. Policy Considerationsof Split-Recovery Statutes
Punitive damages have been criticized for a myriad of reasons. Some critics
believe that the two major justifications of such damages, punishment and
deterrence, should have no home in the civil law.76 Others, citing the great
discretion afforded a jury in determining such an award, 7' contend that punitive
damages are used to unjustly redistribute wealth, particularly when the defendant
is a corporation.7" The most common argument against punitive damages,

however, is that they allow a plaintiff who has already been compensated for his
actual losses to receive a large windfall. 79 Advocates of tort reform in this area
argue that such a windfall does little, if anything, to promote the goals espoused
by defenders of punitive damages. 0
As noted, the most compelling argument for the existence of punitive
damages in today's legal system is the two-fold effect of punishment and
deterrence."' However, allowing a plaintiff to retain a massive punitive damage
award would appear to do little to further these considerations. While some
commentators see such windfalls as necessary and inevitable consequences of
punitive damages,82 others urge a more "judicious allocation of resources."83
Split-recovery statutes directly address this issue. Under such a statute, the state
collects a portion of a punitive damage award; this portion is typically deposited
either in the state treasury or in a fund, often created by the statute, for the
benefit of a certain class of persons. Thus, split-recovery statutes have been
embraced as effective mechanisms for addressing the concerns of critics, without

75. Id.
76. See supra note 57.
77. See supranote 75 and accompanying text.
78. Kansas City v. Keene Corp., 855 S.W.2d 360, 377 (Mo. 1993).
79. "It is difficult on principle to understand why, when the sufferer by a tort has
been fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover anything more. And it is
equally difficult to understand why, if the tortfeasor is to be punished by the exemplary
damages, they should go to the compensated sufferer, and not to the public in whose
behalf he is punished." Gregory Nathan Hoole, In the Wake of Seemingly Exorbitant
Punitive Damage Awards America Demands Caps on Punitive Damages: Are We
Barking Up the Wrong Tree?, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 459,464 (1996). See Klaben, supra
note 3, at 105; Stevens, supranote 6, at 869.
80. See generally Hoole, supra note 79; Klaben, supranote 3, at 105; Stevens,
supranote 6, at 869.
81. See supranotes 57-60 and accompanying text.
82. Stevens, supranote 6, at 869.
83. Stevens, supra note 6, at 869-70.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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jeopardizing the interests to be served by awarding punitive damages in the first
place."
As an additional benefit, split-recovery statutes may have the effect of
discouraging unnecessary, excessive, and frivolous litigation.85 Although one
of the justifications for punitive damages cited by proponents is that they provide
plaintiffs with an incentive to sue, this stimulus is viewed by some as having
become far too great.86 Particularly in today's legal system, where contingency
fees may convince plaintiffs that they have little to lose by filing suit, the
potential for a substantial recovery of punitive damages may invite such
litigation.87 Split-recovery statutes work to diminish this incentive, because any
award recovered by the plaintiff must be shared with the state.
C. ConstitutionalAttacks on Split-Recovery Statutes
The constitutionality of split-recovery statutes has come into question in a
number of states, under a multitude of theories, and with differing results in the
courts. These attacks have come from both plaintiffs, who are allowed to collect
only a portion of their punitive damage award,88 and defendants, who must pay
a portion of the punitive damages assessed against them to the state.89 The
arguments proffered in other jurisdictions have been numerous and of various
efficacy. For the purposes of this Note, the issues discussed will be limited to
the most common or compelling, as well as those "lesser" arguments that were
also raised in Fust.
A recurring argument against split-recovery statutes is that they deny
plaintiffs a property right without due process of law,9" in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. One's right to
due process prior to being deprived of life, liberty, or property consists of both
substantive and procedural components. 9 Unfortunately, the courts often fail to

84. Stevens, supranote 6, at 861-62.
85. Stevens, supra note 6, at 870-71.
86. Stevens, supra note 6, at 862-64.
87. E.Jeffley Grube, PunitiveDamages:A MisplacedRemedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
839, 858 (1993)
88. See, e.g., McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga.
1990); Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991); Gordon v. State, 603 So.
2d 800 (Fla. 1992); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assoc.,
473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
89. See, e.g., Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1115 (1994); Tenold
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
90. See, e.g., Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802; McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1569-70.
91. See WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1076-77 (10th ed. 1997) (explaining the "relationship between 'fair
substance' and 'fair procedure').
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clarify whether they are concerned with the former or latter component. 92 An
examination of the cases will nonetheless help to elucidate the issues involved
in determining whether a right to either substantive or procedural due process
has been violated.
Plaintiffs challenging split-recovery statutes on substantive due process
grounds have done so under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution93 and the due process clauses of their respective state
constitutions. 9 In both instances, courts have applied rational-basis review in
analyzing the constitutionality of the particular split-recovery statute. 9 Under
such review, the statute need only be rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose.' Most statutes will survive such scrutiny because under rational-basis
review, a statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the plaintiff has the burden
of proving the contrary. 97

The results of substantive due process challenges to split-recovery statutes
in other jurisdictions have differed. For example, in Gordon v. State98 the
Supreme Court of Florida upheld that state's split-recovery statute in the face of
such a challenge." The court held that the statute bore a rational relationship to
the legitimate objectives of "allot[ing] to the public weal a portion of damages
designed to deter future harm to the public and to discourage punitive damage
claims ... ."" On the other hand, in McBride v. GeneralMotors Corp.10' a
Georgia federal district court did not think that the state's split-recovery statute
furthered a legitimate governmental interest in raising revenue and declared the
statute unconstitutional. °2
Distinct from substantive due process, procedural due process is a principle
that serves to reduce the "mistakes" created by big government vis-i-vis one's
property rights.0 3 The doctrine requires that persons be afforded certain
processes, such as notice and the opportunity for a fair hearing, before being
deprived of liberty or a vested property right.1°4 However, before reaching the

92. See, e.g., McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1566.

93. "No State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law ..... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.1.
94. See, e.g., Statement, Brief and Argument of Appellants at 51-54, Fust v.
Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1997) (79416).
95. See, e.g., Gordon, 608 S.W.2d at 802; McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1569-70.

96. Stevens, supranote 6, at 878.
97. National. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470
U.S. 451, 477 (1985).

98. 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992).
99. Id. at 802.
100. Id.
101. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
102. Id. at 1569-70.
103. See COHEN & VARAT, supra note 91, at 1076.
104. See COHEN & VARAT, supranote 91, at 1076.
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issue of exactly what process is due a person, it is necessary to establish that a
liberty or property right is indeed implicated. 5 It is at this initial analytical level
that procedural due process attacks on split-recovery statutes have failed or
prevailed."°
The United States Constitution does not create property rights.10 7 "Rather
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law .... 1,, 8
Thus, states that have confronted this issue have examined their own state law
to determine whether punitive damages are a property right vested in a plaintiff
throughout her cause of action. In Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice PetridesDonohue & Associates,'09 the Supreme Court of Iowa answered that question in
the negative and upheld its state's split-recovery statute." 0 The court reiterated
its position that punitive damages are not a matter of right but are merely
discretionary."' Similarly, Missouri has long held the position that punitive
damages awards, prior to entry ofjudgment, are not a property right vested in the
plaintiff of a tort action. " 2
A theory similar to, and often blurred in the cases so as to be
indistinguishable from, procedural due process is the idea that a split-recovery
statute works an unconstitutional "taking" in contravention of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution."' The Fifth Amendment has long
been held to apply to the states;" thus, no state may take private property for
public use without just compensation. However, most takings challenges have
failed for the same reason that procedural due process arguments have failed:
punitive damages are not a vested property right under state law." 5 In Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle," 6 the Supreme Court of Georgia applied such an analysis

105. "The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of
interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property
....But the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite ....
[T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look
...
to the natureof the interest at stake." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 56971 (1972) (emphasis in original).
106. See, e.g., Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Mo. 1997).
107. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.

108. Id.
109. 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
110. Id. at 619.
111. Id.
112. Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
113. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST., amend V.
114. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).
115. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
116. 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993).
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in upholding its state's split-recovery statute." 7 On the other hand, in Kirk v.
Denver PublishingCo."' the Supreme Court of Colorado declared that "there is
no question that under Colorado law a judgment for exemplary damages
qualifies as a property interest," and struck down the state's split-recovery
statute." 9 As noted in the discussion on procedural due process, in Missouri, a
plaintiff has no vested right in an award of punitive damages. 2
Challengers of split-recovery statutes also have attempted to strike down
such legislation by employing equal protection arguments.'
Split-recovery
statutes may discriminate in a number of ways, such as between state-court
litigants and federal-court litigants, i" between plaintiffs who litigate and
plaintiffs who settle out of court," and between plaintiffs with differing causes
of action, such as products liability plaintiffs and all other plaintiffs.2 However,
split-recovery statutes neither burden fundamental rights nor discriminate based
upon race or any other suspect class, and as such are merely subject to rationalbasis review. '2 Under such review, a discriminatory classification is valid if it
bears a rational relation to a legitimate state interest.'26
As with due process attacks, the results of equal protection challenges to
split-recovery statutes in other jurisdictions have been contradictory. In Conkle,
the Supreme Court of Georgia found that the Georgia statute's distinction
between products liability plaintiffs and all other tort plaintiffs was reasonable,
in light of the state's interest in punishing products liability defendants without
imposing unlimited liability and creating a multitude of plaintiff windfalls.'27
Likewise, in Gordon the Supreme Court of Florida held that the state's splitrecovery statute did not violate equal protection.'28 In McBride, however, the

117. Id. at 639.
118. 818 P.2d 262 (Co. 1991).
119. Id. at 267.
120. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1576-77
(M.D. Ga. 1990); Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992); Mack Trucks, Inc.
v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993);
122. This issue was raised, and rejected, in Fust v. Attorney General. Any
argument as to this kind of discrimination would presumably fail, as the Erie doctrine
would require a federal court to apply a state's substantive law, including a split-recovery
statute.
123. No state's split-recovery statute attempts to collect a portion of an out-of-court
settlement.
124. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (Supp. 1994) (applying only to
products liability actions); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (1996) (applying only to medical
malpractice actions).
125. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997).
126. Id.
127. Mack Truck, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993).
128. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992).
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court found such a classification to be "arbitrary and unreasonable," and declared
the statute unconstitutional. 29 Upon examination of Missouri's split-recovery
statute, it is clear that no distinction is made between plaintiffs with differing
tort actions. However, the statute does discriminate between plaintiffs who fully
litigate their cause of
action and those who settle, as the statute applies only to
30
"final judgments.'

Challenges to split-recovery statutes also have been pursued on the grounds
that such statutes violate various provisions of state constitutions prohibiting a
statute from dealing with more than a single subject or containing subject matter
different from that expressed in the statute's title.' 3 ' These arguments have been
addressed in only a few jurisdictions; however, they 3 are
worth a brief
2
examination because both claims also were raised in Fust

The McBride court agreed that Georgia's split-recovery statute violated that
state's constitution by containing subject matter different from that found
elsewhere in the statute and different from that expressed in the title. The court
held, without explanation, that the statute contained matter "different from what
is expressed in the title of the Tort Reform Act,' 33 and that the subject matter of
the statute was "matter other than that relating to torts."'' 34 The Supreme Court

of Georgia disagreed with the former point, however, and held in Conkle that the
subject matter
of the statute was not different from that expressed in the title of
35
the statute.1

Similar subject-matter and title requirements are imposed by the Missouri
Constitution. 36 In Missouri, the single-subject-matter requirement is satisfied
if each provision of the bill "fairly relates to the subject described in the title of
a bill, has a natural connection to the subject, or is a means to accomplish the
law's purpose."' 137 As to the "clearly expressed" title requirement, this may be
violated in only two ways: the title may be too "general or amorphous '' 3B or the
title may be so restrictive that a particular provision is rejected because it falls
9
/
outside the scope of the subject.

129. McBride v. General Motor's Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1576-77 (M.D. Ga.
1990).
130. Mo. REv.STAT. § 537.675(2) (1994).
131. See, e.g., McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1578; Conkle, 436 S.E.2d at 639.
132. Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424,427-29 (Mo. 1997).
133. McBride, 737 F.Supp. at 1569.
134. Id.
135. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d at 639.
136. See supra note 28.

137. Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 428.
138. Id. (citing Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 n.3 (Mo.
1994)).
139. Id. (citing Carmack v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Agriculture, 945 S.W.2d 956
(Mo. 1997)).
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Split-recovery statutes have been challenged on a number of theories
beyond those discussed above. The purpose of this Note is noto discuss every
one of these arguments at length. However, two additional theories, often raised
by the defendant of the prior tort action, are common and worth mention. First,
split-recovery statutes have been challenged as allowing excessive fines 4 in
contravention of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' 4 '
Second, defendants have argued that paying the punitive damages assessed
against them to the state may raise double jeopardy implications, 42 thereby
violating the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.44 A brief
survey of these issues will show that the constitutionality of Missouri's splitrecovery statute has yet to be completely resolved.
In Browning-FerrisIndustries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,Inc.,144
the United States Supreme Court held that the "Excessive Fines [C]lause does
not apply to awards of punitive damages between private parties. 145 However,
the Court "left open the question whether a qui tam action, in which a private
party brings suit in the name of the United States and shares in any award of
damages would implicate" the Excessive Fines Clause."4 Although under a
split-recovery statute the state does not become a named party in the action,
many commentators believe that the Court implicitly was stating that such a
sharing of a punitive damage award with the government would trigger the
Excessive Fines Clause. 47 However, these commentators often overlook other
important language in Browning-Ferris:the Court expressly declined to decide
whether the Eighth Amendment even applies to the states through the
incorporation doctrine."4 A number of courts have analyzed the constitutionality

140. See, e.g., McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1577-78
(M.D. Ga. 1990); Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 868-69
(Iowa 1994); Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413, 423 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
" U.S.
141. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed ....
CONST.'amend. VIII.
142. See, e.g., Burke v. Deer, 780 F. Supp. 1225, 1242 (W.D. Iowa 1991); Spaur,
510 N.W.2d at 868-69.
143. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ..... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
144. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
145. Id. at 263-64.
146. Id. at 276.
147. See Stevens, supra note 6, at 888-89.
148. 492 U.S. at 276. "[W]e need not answer several questions that otherwise
might be necessarily antecedent to finding the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause applicable to an award of punitive damages ....We shall not decide whether the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines applies to the several States through
the Fourteenth Amendment ......
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of split-recovery statutes under the Excessive Fines Clause without even
addressing this critical issue. 4 9
Only one court has cited a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause in
striking down a state's split-recovery statute. In McBride, the court felt that
Georgia's split-recovery statute "convert[ed] the civil nature action of the prior
Georgia punitive damages statute into a statute where fines are being made for
the benefit of the State... ."'o Beyond the fact that incorporation was not
discussed in McBride, two other issues are noteworthy. First, the decision is
clearly contradictory to the majority of courts: Burke v. Deere,' Spaur v.
Owens-CorningFiberglasCorp.,15 2 and Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser"3 all addressed
this issue and found no constitutional violation. Second, whatever the court
believed the nature of the statute had become, the Excessive Fines Clause was
not an appropriate tool for striking down the statute as facially invalid.
Regardless of whether the statute exacted a fine on persons for the benefit of the
state, only excessive fines are prohibited. Such excessiveness can be determined
only by a case-by-case analysis."s4 Nonetheless, McBride is useful in showing
that there are other arguments, unaddressed in Fust,that may convince a court
to strike down a split-recovery statute.
Split-recovery statutes also have been challenged as violating the Double
55
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. In United States v. Halper,1
the United States Supreme Court recognized that the imposition of punitive
damages in a civil suit may subject a defendant to double jeopardy if the person
already has been criminally convicted for his offense.s 6 The Court held that if
the civil action was punitive, rather than remedial in nature, the action qualifies
as punishment and triggers the Double Jeopardy Clause.'- 7 Indeed, the purpose

149. See supranote 140. None of these cases specifically addressed the issue of
whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states.
150. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
151. 780 F. Supp. 1225, 1242 (W.D. Iowa 1991) rev'don other grounds, 6 F.3d
497 (8th. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1115 (1994).
152. 510 N.W.2d 854, 868-69 (Iowa 1994).
153. 873 P.2d 413, 423 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
154. See Recent Case, supra note 6, at 1696.
155. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
156. Id. at 452. But see Kirgis, supra note 6, at 867. "Ifthe decision stands as
written, it raises almost insurmountable practical problems. If a criminal prosecution
bars a subsequent civil punitive recovery, then a punitive recovery must bar a subsequent
criminal prosecution. Because the regulatory branches of the government do not act in
concert with the criminal branch, that proposition raises the prospect of a penalty
imposed by the Internal Revenue Service barring a criminal prosecution for the same
conduct. A rule requiring such a result seems unlikely to survive." Kirgis, supranote
6, at 867.
157. Id. at 449-50.
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of punitive damages in most states, including Missouri, is to punish and deter the
defendant." 8
It remains unclear whether a split-recovery statute, under which a state does
not prosecute nor is named in the action, but merely shares in the award of
punitive damages, implicates the Double Jeopardy Clause." 9 Two courts,
however, have answered that question in the negative. In Spaur, the Iowa
Supreme Court focused on the fact that the state had neither prosecuted the
action nor attempted to raise revenue via fines, and held that the limited nature
of the state's interest was insufficient to render the statute criminal in nature so
as to trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause. 60 Likewise, the Burke court rejected
a double jeopardy claim, stating only that the defendant "fail[ed] to put forward
any meaningful argument in this area ....
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected each
argument advanced by the Fusts as to the unconstitutionality of Section 537.675
of the Revised Statutes of Missouri. The Court was presented with three issues
that have been the bases of constitutional challenges to split-recovery statutes in
other jurisdictions: procedural due process, equal protection, and the singlesubject/clear title provisions of state constitutions.
The procedural due process challenge by the Fusts was easily disposed of
by the court. The court held that when the Fusts' claim against the defendants
in the original action arose, "they acquired no more than a 50% interest in such
judgment as would be entered for punitive damages."' 62 Also, the court noted
that the "Constitution does not forbid the... abolition of old [rights] recognized
by the common law."'' 6 The court distinguished the case from the one presented
in Kirk, noting that the Colorado statute attempted to take away property "once
vested by a judgment."' In Missouri, on the other hand, a plaintiff never has
a greater interest in more than one-half of a punitive damages judgment. 65 The

158. See supranotes 57-60 and accompanying text.
159. "Central to the theory of double jeopardy is the idea that the government
should not use its power and resources to subject a defendant to repeated prosecutions.
Therefore, a court may find that the mere diversion of money to the government does not
by itself distinguish that type of action from a private civil action immune from double
jeopardy analysis." Kirgis, supranote 6, at 866.
160. Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 868-69 (Iowa
1994).
161. Burke v. Deer, 780 F. Supp. 1225, 1242 (W.D. Iowa 1991), rev'd on other
grounds,6 F.3d 497 (8th. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1115 (1994)
162. Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Mo. 1997).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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court also disagreed with the implication of the Kirk court "that a plaintiff has
a greater property interest in a judgment upon a tort claim than the interest
recognized by law when the claim accrued."' 6 As a punitive damages award
does not constitute a property interest in Missouri, the court did not need to
inquire further as to whether the Fusts had been denied due process of law.
Similarly, the court rejected the Fusts' contention that Section 537.675
violates equal protection of the law, and is similarly a "special law" prohibited
by article I, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution. The Fusts argued a
violation of equal protection principles under two theories. First, they claimed
that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates between those plaintiffs who
fully litigate their tort actions and those who settle out of court. 67 Second, they
contended that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates between those
plaintiffs who sue in federal court and those who sue in state court. 68
As to the first claim, the court declared that since the legislation did not
"employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights,"' 69 a rational
basis standard of review was appropriate. The court stated that such legislation
is presumed to be rational and that the Fusts had failed to meet their burden to
prove otherwise.17 The court intimated various reasons as to why such
distinctions by the statute are rational, including that the legislature may have
wished to encourage settlement, the legislature may have believed it would be
simpler to collect its portion if the award was pursuant to a final judgment, or the
As to the
legislature may have wished to avoid enforcement difficulties.'
Fusts' contention that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates between
federal and state litigants, the court noted that the statute itself makes no such
distinction, and that the one case relied upon by the Fusts in drawing this
distinction had been erroneously interpreted by the Fusts. 72
Likewise, the court held that the statute was not a "special law" prohibited
by article Ill, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution. 73 The court stated that a
"special law" is one that "includes less than all who are similarly situated.. .but
a law is not special if it applies to all of a given class alike and the classification
is made on a reasonable basis."'7 Again, the court held that the legislature acted
reasonably
in discriminating between plaintiffs who litigate and plaintiffs who
17
settle. 1
166. Id.
167. Id. at 431-32.
168. Id. at 432.
169. Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 432.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Batek v. Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 920 S.W.2d 895, 899
(Mo. 1996) (omission in original).
175. Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 432.
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The court also dismissed a two-pronged attack on House Bill 700, which
was the basis for Section 537.675. As to both of these contentions, the court
held that the Fusts had failed to sustain the burden necessary to prove the
unconstitutionality of a statute."
The first prong of this assault claimed that the bill contravened article HI,
section 23 of the Missouri Constitution, in that the bill contained more than one
subject. 77 The Fusts argued that the fact that the bill contained a variety of
provisions, ranging from the regulation of liability insurance carriers to the
establishment of the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund, clearly contravened this
constitutional mandate. 78 However, the court made it clear that the singlesubject requirement would be satisfied if "all provisions of the bill fairly relate
to the same subject, have a natural connection therewith, or are incidents or
means to accomplish its purpose.'

79

The court emphasized that the test focuses

on the subject of the bill as set out in the title and whether each individual
provision fairly relates to the subject in the title.' Because the title of House
Bill 700 explicitly stated that it was enacted "for the purpose of assuring just
18
compensation for certain persons' damages,"
' the court held that this
82
constitutional provision was satisfied.

The second prong of this attack on House Bill 700 argued that the subject
of the bill was not "clearly expressed" in the bill's title.' The court discussed
two ways in which this provision may be violated: the subject may either be so
general as to violate the single subject requirement, or may be so restrictive that
certain provisions fall outside the scope of the subject as expressed in the title.'
The Fusts claimed that the latter of these situations existed with regard to House
Bill 700. However, the court noted that nothing in the title restricted the subject
in such a way that the statute could not apply to punitive damages rather than
actual damages, nor did the words "just compensation" necessarily exclude
reference to tort cases where the plaintiff seeks punitive damages. 8 5 The court
also briefly discussed the former argument, noting that the title of the bill was
not so amorphous or general as to prevent it from being valid.'86
Beyond the preceding arguments, the court was presented with a number
of arguments which have not been addressed in other jurisdictions with respect
to split-recovery statutes. First, the Fusts contended that Missouri's split176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at429.
Id. at 427-28.
Id. at428.
Id. (citing Akin v. Director of Rev., 934 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Mo. 1996)).
Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 428.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 428.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 429.
Id.
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recovery statute unconstitutionally attempts to grant public monies to private
187
persons, in violation of article III, section 38(a) of the Missouri Constitution.
However, the court refuted this argument by noting that such a grant is
constitutional if it serves a public purpose. 8 8 Because the creation of a fund to
"compensate certain tort victims who might otherwise be forced to rely on public
assistance" is a valid public purpose, the court held that the statute does not
contravene article III, section 38(a).' 89
Two further assertions by the Fusts were that Section 537.675 directs that
monies go into a fund other than the treasury, and that the statute authorizes
distribution of those monies without appropriation, both in violation of article III,
section 3 of the Missouri Constitution.'9 The court summarily dismissed these
assertions. First, the court declared that the Missouri Constitution does not
prohibit the legislature from creating special funds within the treasury, and that
absent such a prohibition, the power of the General Assembly is plenary.' 9'
Second, the court noted that the Missouri legislature had yet to distribute monies
from the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund, and that there was no threat to do
so without proper appropriation. Until such time, the court held, such a claim
was not ripe for review."
The court next rejected the Fusts' claim that Section 537.675 violates the
Missouri Constitution's separation of powers doctrine as prescribed by article II,
section 1, and article V, section 1.93 The argument advanced by the Fusts was
that the statute "deprives the courts of the power to enforce judgments as they
are rendered."' 94 However, the court points out that the statute merely limits a
common law cause of action for punitive damages, rather than interfering with
judicial functions. Therefore, the General Assembly was not unconstitutionally
encroaching upon the judiciary in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.' 95
The court used essentially the same rationale in rejecting the Fusts claim
that the split-recovery statute violates the "certain remedy" provision of the
Missouri Constitution, as prescribed in article I, section 14.'96 As with the
separation of powers argument, the court held that the statute merely modifies
a common law cause of action for punitive damages, and specifically cited cases

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 429-30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 430-31.
Id.
Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 431.
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that have held that such modification is not prohibited under Missouri's "certain
remedy" provision.197
Next, the court addressed the Fusts' contention that Section 537.675 denies
them their "natural right to... the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry,"
in contravention of article I, section 2 of the Missouri Constitution. 9 The court
assumed, arguendo, that the efforts of the Fusts, including filing suits, giving
depositions, and the like, constituted "industry." Nonetheless, the court denied
this constitutional claim, stating that the Fusts cited no Missouri authority in
support of this proposition.'99
For all the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, holding that Section 537.675 of the Revised Statutes
of Missouri is constitutional.2 0
V. COMMENT
In upholding Section 537.675 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, the
Supreme Court of Missouri adhered to the reasoning followed in the majority of
jurisdictions, and effectively addressed a few arguments previously unexplored
with respect to split-recovery statutes. In so doing, the court upheld the state's
power to collect one-half of all punitive damage awards, which is subsequently
deposited in the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund.2"' The holding is consistent
with the tenets of constitutional law, and reaffirms the state's plenary power,
absent a constitutional prohibition, to enact legislation. 2°" As a result, the court
has upheld the validity of a statute that attempts to deal with some of the
problems of punitive damage awards and put such awards to a more profitable
and judicious use.2 0 3 The purposes justifying awards of punitive damages in
Missouri are the punishment of the tortfeasor and deterrence of the wrongful
conduct in the future. Allowing a plaintiff to retain a massive windfall does
nothing to further this goal, and in fact has deleterious effects such as stimulating
litigation to undesirable levels. Split-recovery statutes work to rectify these
problems, without sacrificing the goals to be furthered by the punitive damages
in the first place.
The court was presented in Fust with myriad arguments of varying
persuasiveness.
Three of these contentions-that such statutes violate

197. Id. (citing Wheeler v. Briggs, 941 S.W.2d 512, 514-15 (Mo. 1997), and
Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 905-06 (Mo. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 991 (1992)).
198. Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 431.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 433.
201. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.675(1), (2) (1994).
202. Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424,430 (Mo. 1997).
203. See generally supranotes 76-87.
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procedural due process, equal protection, and state constitutional requirements
of subject matter and title-were common to both Fust and cases addressing
split-recovery statutes in other jurisdictions.
As to the first of these arguments, the dispositive factor for the court was
that a potential recovery in a punitive damage award does not constitute a
property right in the state of Missouri.2°4 Not only has this been the law in
Missouri for years, it is a just and logical viewpoint. The major purposes of
punitive damages are to punish the tortfeasor and to deter the tortfeasor and
others from re-engaging in the wrongful conduct." 5 Missouri has expressly
declared that punishment and deterrence are the primary purposes of punitive
damage awards. 2 6 As punitive damages do not serve to compensate, a plaintiff
awarded punitive damages receives a fortuitous windfall "simply because there
is no one else to receive it.""2 7 It would not be logical to conclude that such a
windfall, prior to collection, composed a property right. Also, the fact that some
states have elected to cap or completely abolish punitive damages further
indicates that a vested right has not been created.0 8 Because an award of
punitive damages is not a property right in Missouri, the Fusts' procedural due
process claim failed.
As to the Fusts' equal protection argument, the court approached the claim
with a flexibility consonant with rational basis review. Missouri's split-recovery
statute does not implicate suspect classes; as such, the classification need only
be rational.0 9 In light of the state's interests in encouraging settlement and
avoiding enforcement difficulties, the discrimination between those plaintiffs
who fully litigate their cases and those who settle meets this threshold
requirement of rationality.2"0
The court also effectively disposed of the Fusts' claim that Section 537.675
violates the single subject and clear title provisions of the Missouri Constitution.
As to both claims, the Fusts failed to sustain their burden of proving the statute's
unconstitutionality.211 This is clearly the correct result. First, all sections of
House Bill 700 purport to accomplish the same purpose: the promotion of
compensation for certain tort victims." 2 As the provisions of the bill "fairly

204. Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), overruled
on other grounds, Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988).
205. See supranotes 57-60 and accompanying text.

206. Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 849 (Mo. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770
(1997).
207. Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473
N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991).
208. See, e.g., supra note 52.
209. Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424,432 (Mo. 1997).

210. Id.
211. Id. at 427-29.

212. Id. at 428.
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relate" to each other, the single subject requirement is met." 3 Second, the title
of the bill is neither so general as to violate the clear title requirement, nor is it
so restrictive that the subject matter of Section 537.675 falls outside the scope
of the title.214

The Missouri Supreme Court also addressed a number of arguments which
have not been addressed in other jurisdictions with respect to the
constitutionality of split-recovey , statutes. These arguments included, among
2 15
others, that Section 537.675 attempts to grant public monies to private persons,
authorizes monies to be distributed from the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund
17
without proper appropriation,216 and violates the separation of powers doctrine
None of these contentions were particularly compelling, and the court easily
disposed of each in upholding Missouri's split-recovery.
Beyond these arguments asserted in Fust, there remain numerous other
theories which have served as the foundation for challenges to split-recovery
statutes in otherjurisdictions. It remains to be seen whether Section 537.675 will
be challenged, perhaps successfully, on substantive due process, takings,
excessive fines, or double jeopardy grounds in the future. A substantive due
process theory would likely fail, because, under rational-basis review, the statute
need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.218 Given this
low level of scrutiny, and the fact that Section 537.675 survived such review
under equal protection analysis,1 9 it is improbable that a Missouri court would
declare the statute unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds.
Likewise, a takings challenge should fail in Missouri for the same reason that
a procedural due process attack was rejected in Fust: punitive damages do not
constitute a property interest in this state.220 More intriguing are the issues of
whether Missouri's split-recovery statute would survive excessive fines and
double jeopardy challenges. The day may come when a defendant successfully
invokes such a challenge; until that day, however, tort plaintiffs will be entitled
to collect only one-half of the punitive damages awarded to them.
An entirely distinct question from the constitutionality of Missouri's splitrecovery statute is whether the Missouri government has faithfuly adhered to the
goals to be effectuated by the statute and put the monies collected to a use
consistent with the purposes of split-recovery statutes. It is clear that
enforcement of Section 537.675 by the Missouri attorney general has been lax
in past years. As of 1997, ten years after the statute was enacted, the Tort
213. Id.
214. Id. at 428-29.
215. Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 429-30.

216. Id. at 430.
217. Id. at 430-31.
218. Stevens, supra note 6, at 878.
219. Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 431-32.
220. Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), overruled
on othergrounds, Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988).
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Victims' Compensation Fund was credited barely over fifty-five thousand
dollars.22' This figure certainly is not representative of one-half of all punitive
damages awarded in Missouri in the last decade.m It is however a substantial
amount of money that could greatly benefit the class of persons to be served by
the statute. Nonetheless, the General Assembly has yet to promulgate
disbursement procedures for the fund.
Ten years after the passage of a potentially beneficial piece of legislation,
one of the statute's major purposes-to compensate tort victims who otherwise
remain uncompensated-has been furthered in no way whatsoever. Hopefully, the
publicity surrounding Fust will serve to renew interest in the statute and have
some augmenting effects on the minimal enforcement and nonexistent
disbursement procedures currently in effect. Regardless, judging the "wisdom"
of the legislature in enacting legislation is not the duty of the judiciary. 223 The
decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri to uphold this state's split-recovery
statute against the constitutional attacks propounded was a decidedly appropriate
one.
VI. CONCLUSION
In upholding Missouri's split-recovery statute, Section 537.675 of the
Revised Statutes of Missouri, the Missouri Supreme Court applied an analysis
harmonious with the basic tenets of constitutional law. By upholding the statute,
the court affirmed Missouri's power to collect one-half of all punitive damage
awards for deposit in the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund. In doing so, the
court upheld a statute which purports to ameliorate some of the problems
associated with awards of punitive damages. It remains to be seen, however,
whether the split-recovery statute will survive future constitutional attacks based
upon principles other than those raised in Fust.

221. As of May 1997 (prior to the Fust decision), the balance of the Tort Victims'
Compensation Fund was $56,829.73. STATE TREASURER ACCT. & BANKING REP. (May
21, 1997).

222. According to one source, the lack of enforcement of Missouri's split-recovery
statute has cost the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund over $200 million in the last ten
years. Telephone Interview with David Israelite, Chief of Staff and Head Counsel for
United States Senator Kit Bond (Jan. 8, 1997).
223. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/11

24

1998]

Evans: Evans: Split-Recovery Survives:
CIVIL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

535

Tort victims hoping to be benefitted by the Tort Victims' Compensation
Fund will have to wait for legislators to promulgate disbursement procedures.
Perhaps the publicity surrounding a Missouri Supreme Court decision such as
Fust will renew interest in the statute, prompting stricter enforcement of the
statute and disbursement from the Fund, thereby effectuating the purposes to be
served by a split-recovery statute.
BENJAMIN F. EVANS
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